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The Returns to Knowledge Hierarchies
Luis Garicano London School of Economics
Thomas N. Hubbard Northwestern University
March 23, 2016
Abstract
Hierarchies allow individuals to leverage their knowledge through otherstime.
This mechanism increases productivity and amplies the impact of skill heterogene-
ity on earnings inequality. This paper analyzes the earnings and organization of U.S.
lawyers and uses an equilibrium model of knowledge hierarchies inspired by Gari-
cano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) to assess how much lawyersproductivity and the
distribution of earnings across lawyers reects lawyersability to organize problem-
solving hierarchically. Our estimates imply that hierarchical production leads to at
least a 30% increase in productivity in this industry, relative to a situation where
lawyers within the same o¢ ce do not vertically specialize.We further nd that it
amplies earnings inequality, mostly by increasing the earnings of the very highest
percentile lawyers in business and litigation-related segments.
We thank Pol Antras, Matthew Gentzkow, Lars Nesheim and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg and partici-
pants at various seminars, the 2006 Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, and NBER Summer
Institute for comments and suggestions. We are especially grateful to Steve Tadelis, who presented this
paper and o¤ered extensive comments at the latter, and to the Editor and referees at this journal. The
research in this paper was conducted while the authors were Census Bureau research associates at the
Chicago Research Data Center. Research results and conclusions are those of the authors and do not
necessarily indicate concurrence by the Bureau of the Census. This paper has been screened to ensure
that no condential data are revealed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Knowledge is an asset with increasing returns because acquiring it involves a xed cost,
independent of its subsequent utilization. But when knowledge is embodied in individuals,
they must spend time applying it to each specic problem they face and possibly also
communicating specic solutions to others. This makes it di¢ cult for individuals to
exploit these increasing returns, relative to a situation where knowledge can be encoded
in blueprints, as in Romer (1986, 1990). For example, radiologists who are experts at
interpreting x-rays generally cannot sell their knowledge in a market like a blueprint;
instead, they usually must apply their knowledge to each patients specic x-ray. A way
around this problem is vertical, or hierarchical, specialization where some non-expert
radiologists (e.g., residents) diagnose routine cases and request help from experts in cases
they nd di¢ cult. Recent work in organizational economics, starting with Garicano
(2000), has analyzed how such knowledge hierarchies allow experts to exploit increasing
returns from their knowledge by leveraging it through otherstime.
What are the returns to these knowledge hierarchies? In this paper we study this
question empirically in a context where production depends strongly on solving problems:
legal services. We analyze the earnings and organization of U.S. lawyers, and use a
model inspired by the equilibrium model of knowledge hierarchies in Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2006) to provide evidence on the returns to specialization that hierarchical
production provides lawyers, and the impact this has on earnings inequality among these
individuals.1
We proceed in two stages. We begin in Section II by developing an equilibrium model
of hierarchical production, adapting Garicano and Rossi-Hansbergs (2006) framework
to facilitate estimation of the returns to managerial span or leverage (the number of
workers per manager). In this model, individuals have heterogeneous ability some are
more skilled than others and hierarchical production allows more talented individuals
to leverage their knowledge by applying it to others time. Our production function
captures the organization of the division of labor within hierarchies, which is derived from
rst principles in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), through two assumptions. First,
managers who increase their span of control must work with higher-skilled workers, since
increasing span requires them to delegate tasks they previously did themselves. Second,
working in a team involves coordination costs that do not appear when individuals work
on their own. The hierarchical production functionand equilibrium assignment that
results contain two crucial features that shape and facilitate our empirical work: rst, the
productivity of a hierarchical team, per unit of time spent in production, is determined
only by the managers skill and not the workers skill; second, managerial leverage is an
invertible function of worker skill.
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We then use this model as an input to our empirical work, which uses data from
the U.S. Economic Census on thousands of law o¢ ces throughout the United States.
These data contain law o¢ ce-level information on, among other things, partnersearnings,
associatesearnings, and associate-partner ratios. Our empirical work provides evidence
on the returns to hierarchyhow much production would be lost if partners were not
able to vertically specializeby delegating work to associates, and to construct earnings
distributions across lawyers, comparing those we observe to those that would obtain if
lawyers could not organize hierarchically. We conclude that hierarchical production
has a substantial e¤ect on lawyersproductivity, raising lawyersoutput by at least 30%
relative to non-hierarchical production. We also nd that hierarchies substantially expand
earnings inequality, mostly by increasing the earnings of the very highest percentile lawyers
in business and litigation-related segments, and leaving relatively una¤ected the earnings
of less leveraged lawyers. Though these e¤ects are reasonably large, we believe them to
be far larger in other sectors of the economy. We discuss the source of these di¤erences
and what they may mean for production in the service sector in the papers conclusion.
We see the contribution of the paper as conceptual as well as substantive. Concep-
tually, we wish to reintroduce the idea that the organization of production and earnings
patterns within industries are jointly determined by the same underlying mechanism: the
equilibrium assignment of individuals to rms and hierarchical positions. This equilib-
rium assignment, in turn, reects the characteristics of the underlying production function
(Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982)).2 This idea has been underexploited, in part because of the
lack of data sets that contain not only information about individualsearnings, but also
on their position within their rmsorganization and their rmscharacteristics.3 To ex-
ploit these patterns requires combining equilibrium analysis with organizational models.
Evidence on who works with whom and in what capacity can be enormously informative,
but inferences from such evidence must be based on equilibrium models since such models
allow assignments to be based on individualscomparative rather than absolute advan-
tage. This approach allows us to develop a rst estimate of the returns to hierarchical
production.
II. ECONOMIC MODEL: HIERARCHIES, ASSIGNMENT, AND
HETEROGENEITY
II.1. Tastes and Technology
Building on Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)
(hereafter, GRH), we develop a general hierarchical assignment model and characterize its
equilibrium properties. Our model is based on a hierarchical production function where,
like in these earlier papers, managerial skill raises the productivity of all the inputs to
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which it is applied.
We assume that demand for a service Z can be described by the demand of a mass of
representative agents with semilinear preferences. We specify:
U = u(z) + y
where u(z) is the utility attained from the consumption of quality z 2 [0; 1] of the service
Z and y is the utility (in dollars) obtained from the rest of the goods in the agents
consumption bundle. We assume u0(z) > 0, and u(0) = 0. Each agent maximizes
utility subject to a budget constraint v(z) + y = Y , where v(z) is the cost (in dollars) of
purchasing a level z of service Z and is an equilibrium object that we characterize below.
Suppliers are endowed with a skill level z 2 [0; 1] and with one unit of time. That is,
they can supply up to quality level z costlessly and above that level at an innite cost. The
population of suppliers is described by a distribution of skill, 
(z); with density function
! (z). Production of the service Z involves the application of individual suppliersskill
and time to production. An agent with skill z can provide a quality z of Z working on
his own with a respective value in the market of v(z).
Following GRH, z can be thought of in our empirical context as an index that reects
the share of client problems in a particular eld that a lawyer working in this eld can
solve: more-skilled lawyers can solve a greater share of these problems than less-skilled
lawyers, and the problems that a less-skilled lawyer can solve are a subset of those that a
more-skilled lawyer can solve.
Hierarchical Production
Agents may work on their own or as part of a hierarchical team. Following Lucas (1978),
Rosen (1982), and GRH, we propose that hierarchical production allows one individuals
skill to be applied to another individuals time. The skill of a hierarchical team is
therefore equal to the maximum skill available in the team. We specify the output of
a team i with one individual (the manager) with skill zm and a measure of n workers
with skill zw as the product of the value of the maximum skill in the team and the time
the team spends in production:
F (zm; zw; n) = v(maxfzm; zwg)t(n)
We make several assumptions about this production function.
Assumption 1: Time in Production The time in production of team i is: ti(n) =
g(n)"i where g(n) is the time available for production and "i reects how e¢ ciently
the team uses its productive time.
Assumption 2: Costly Coordination. Time available for production is increasing in
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team size, g0(n) > 0: Coordination costs imply that time available for production is
less than the teams time endowment, g(n) < n+ 1:
Hierarchical production is thus costly in terms of time: it allows an agents skill to
be applied to othersproduction time, but this takes up (communication) time. Our
empirical analysis will assume that g(n) = (n+ 1); 0 <  < 1, so that n units of worker
time and 1 unit of manager time results in (n+1) units of time available for production.
 is a returns to scale parameter, in this case capturing the returns to scale associated
with managerial leverage. However, our analytical approach does not depend on this
particular specication of g(n).
Assumption 3. Span of Control and Worker Skill. The measure ("number") of work-
ers n with whom a manager can work is weakly positive and an increasing function
in the skill of the workers zw; and thus we write n = n(zw):
n(zw)  0 and n0 (zw) > 0 for all zw and n(0) = 0.4
This assumption captures the idea that managerstime is limited, but managers are
able to delegate tasks to workers. Time-constrained managers who wish to scale up must
delegate to workers tasks that they used to do themselves, and this requires them to work
with more-skilled workers. The greater the skill of the worker, the less help each worker
needs, and the more workers the manager can have on his or her team.5
From Assumptions 1 and 2, it is immediate that it is never optimal to have zm < zw,
and thus we can rewrite our hierarchical production function, without loss of generality,
as:
F (zm; zw; n) = v(zm)t(n(zw)) = v(zm)g(n(zw))"i
The trade-o¤ associated with hierarchical production is now evident. Figure 1 illus-
trates output under hierarchical and non-hierarchical production, in the problem solving
variant, in which g(n) = (n+1) and "i = 1. The top of Figure 1 depicts nonhierarchical
production, in which agents work on their own. The left side of this panel depicts the
skill of n+1 agents. The lines depict these agentstime endowments, the shaded regions
depict these agentsskill or problem-solving ability. n of these agents have skill zw while
1 has skill zm. Assume that each of these agents confronts a set of problems that vary
in their di¢ culty and that each of these sets requires one unit of agent time to handle.
These n+ 1 sets of problems are depicted by the thin bars on the right. Under nonhier-
archical production, each of these agents simply handles the problems they themselves
confront. The value of the output of each of the n lower-skilled agents would be v(zw)
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and value of the output of the higher-skilled agent would be v(zm). Total output would
be v(zm) + nv(zw).
<<COMP: Place Figure 1 about here>>
The bottom part of this Figure depicts hierarchical production. Total output is v(zm)(n(zw)+
1), the product of the value of the managers skill and the time the n+1 agents spend di-
rectly in production. Output per unit of productive time is improved, relative to autarchic
production, because managers can apply their knowledge to more than one set of prob-
lems. This improvement is the benet of hierarchical production; the drawback is that
hierarchical production involves a loss in time spent in production.
The Figure also illustrates the empirical task we will confront when estimating the
returns to hierarchy. Our goal is to compare realized production and earnings to what
production and earnings would be, absent hierarchical production. Our data will contain
information on F (zm; zw), law o¢ cesoutput, and n, law o¢ cesassociate-partner ratio.
It follows that if  were known, one could infer v(zm)"i what partners would earn,
absent hierarchical production because v(zm)"i = F (zm; zw)=(n(zw) + 1). Much of our
empirical focus will therefore be aimed at estimating , or more broadly the time cost
associated with hierarchical production.6
Production in most contexts, even human capital intensive contexts like ours, involves
inputs other than individualsknowledge. We allow for this by introducing overhead
inputs into the model in the following way:
Assumption 4: Monotonic and Convex Overhead Costs. Overhead and other costs
(e.g. for o¢ ce space, support sta¤) are positive, increasing and weakly convex in
total team size, c(n+ 1) > 0; c0(n+ 1) > 0; c00(n+ 1)  0:
Stochastic Elements
Our estimation framework relies on two key equilibrium relationships: a rst order con-
dition characterizing managersoptimal choice of workers and the equilibrium relationship
between an associates earnings w and the associate-partner ratio n at the associates of-
ce. Utilizing these relationships empirically requires us to introduce stochastic elements
into the model in a way that makes the structure of these relationships well-dened but
not deterministic. Assumptions 5 and 6 deal with this.
Assumption 5: Productivity Shocks The productivity shock "i is i.i.d. across o¢ ces,
"i > 0, E("i) = 1. These shocks are realized after organizational decisions are made,
so that they a¤ect partnersearnings but not the organizational equilibrium.
We view this assumption on timing as reasonable in our empirical context, in which
there is a distinct season for hiring associates and where some of the details of production
(e.g., how time-intensive it is to communicate solutions to particular clients) are unknown
at the time associates are hired.7
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Assumption 6: Compensating Di¤erentials. Agents have preferences with respect
to working as associates under di¤erent partners, so that the wage that a partner
at o¢ ce i must pay to compensate associates at the o¢ ce by an amount w equals
wi = wi, where i > 0, E(i) = 1; and i is an absolutely continuous i.i.d. random
variable, and is independent of zm.
Assumption 6 implies that any nonwage amenities of working as associates at o¢ ce i are
valued the same across individuals, and are independent of the skill of the partners.8 Com-
bined with Assumption 5, this assumption keeps the labor market equilibrium tractable
because it implies that any systematic sorting between agents is by skill and not other
dimensions. This rules out multidimensional sorting, but is obviously stringent, in par-
ticular in this context because the independence assumption rules out the possibility that
associates are willing to work for less under higher-skilled partners than lower-skilled part-
ners (perhaps for reasons having to do with training or client contacts). We will discuss
the e¤ect of this assumption on the interpretation of our empirical estimates below.
Equilibrium
Output Market
By the representative agentsrst-order conditions, the price schedule in the output
market is given by the value schedule of the representative consumer: u0(z) = v0(z) subject
to u(z)  v(z): To simplify, we assume that the mass of demanders exceeds the capacity
of suppliers. Under this assumption, the price schedule that solves this problem is given
by the utility of the representative consumer, that is:
v(z) = u(z)
Trivially, this implies a price schedule where v0(z) > 0 and v(0) = 0.
Labor Market
Like in GRH, the continuum of heterogeneous agents make occupational choices and
team composition choices to maximize their compensation given the price schedule v(z).
Each agent chooses whether to be a manager, to work on their own, or be a worker, and
earn in expectation E [Ri(zm; zw)], v(z), or w(z), respectively.
The labor market equilibrium involves solving a continuous assignment problem. The
production function is continuous and involves complementarities between worker and
manager skill, @2F (zm; zw)=(@zm@zw) > 0: Thus in general the assignment exists, is one
to one in terms of skill and is unique (Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim, 2010). Therefore
there exists a matching function zm = m(zw) derived from the equality of supply and
demand for skill at each point that maps the skill of workers to the skill of their managers.
Ri(zm; zw), the residual earnings (or rents) of a manager of skill zm who has hired
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n(zw) workers of skill zw, can be written as:
Ri(zm; zw) = v(zm)"i(n(zw) + 1)
   wi(zw)n(zw)  c(n(zw) + 1) (1)
The rst term is the value of output; in our context, the revenues associated with a partner
and his or her associates. The second term is the wage cost of hiring n(zw) associates of
skill zw: The third term is the overhead cost associated with the partner and associates.
Agents evaluate Ri(zm; zw) at the point where they have chosen the skill level of their
workers to maximize expected earnings given the wage schedule they face wi(zw) =
w(zw)i. The fact that worker skill only enters the production function through manage-
rial leverage implies that the optimization generates a labor market equilibrium that can
be equivalently characterized in terms of the supply and demand for leverage, n :
v(zm)(n+ 1)
 1 = w0i(n)n+ wi(n) + c
0(n+ 1) (2)
where w0i(n) determines how fast wages increase as we increase the skill required to increase
leverage. Workers with higher skill (who can o¤er more help) allow for greater leverage
and receive higher wages than lower-skilled workers. Given zm = m(zw), the sorting
function can be equivalently be written zm = m(n) and the above equation is a di¤erential
equation in w(n); all the other objects are given. This condition holds in equilibrium for
all individuals who choose to be leveraged managers and summarizes these agentsdemand
for leverage. As applied to our context, lawyerschoice of n is greater, the greater their
skill, zm, and the lower i: higher skill makes leverage more valuable and lawyers with
lower i can obtain it at lower cost. The fact that n(zw) is an invertible function of worker
skill means that similar relationships hold when looking at worker skill: lawyers with
higher zm and lower i choose to work with more skilled, as well as more, associates.
An empirical advantage of reformulating the problem in terms of the supply and demand
for leverage rather than the supply and demand for skill is that n(zw) is a variable we
observe directly in the data it is the number of associates per partner. This makes the
rst order condition more useful for estimation purposes because we have eliminated an
unobservable variable. It also helps with respect to utilizing hedonic regressions to provide
evidence on w(n). A common problem that researchers encounter when utilizing hedonic
techniques is sorting on unobservables; absent this reformulation, we would face this
problem as well because we do not observe skill without error (in fact, we do not observe
it at all). Given the assumptions of our model, this is not an issue here. Because there is
no systematic matching between partners and associates on associate characteristics other
than skill, there is no problem associated with sorting on unobservables we observe a
su¢ cient statistic, n, which summarizes all relevant aspects of skill, including both that
which is captured in usual proxies and that which is not.9
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Equations for Estimation.
Using the production function equation F (zm; zw) = v(zm)"i(n+1) and the invertibility
of n(zw), we can rewrite the rst order condition as:
F (zm;n)
n+ 1| {z } "i = w0i(n)n+ wi(n) + c0(n+ 1)| {z } (3)
Average Revenues

"i
= Marginal Cost
The left side of this equation is the marginal benets of leverage, which are the average
revenues per team member multiplied by ="i; the right is the marginal cost of leverage.
This marginal cost contains three terms: the extra wages that need to be paid to all team
members w0i(n)n (increasing leverage requires better as well as more workers), the wage of
the additional agent and the additional overhead cost. This condition can be rewritten
as:
 =
MC
AR
"i (4)
where MC and AR represent the marginal cost and the average revenues, respectively.
Identication of  is based on a straightforward idea that has been applied many times in
the context of estimating returns to scale. In equilibrium, each manager chooses n such
that the marginal benets to leverage equal the marginal cost of leverage. If there are
sharply diminishing returns to leverage if  is close to zero then the marginal cost of
leverage should be low relative to the average benets of leverage. Finding that this is
not the case is evidence that the returns to leverage are not low and therefore the returns
to hierarchical production are substantial. In contrast, if there are constant returns to
leverage   = 1 then the average benets of leverage equal the marginal benets of
leverage, and therefore the average benets of leverage should equal the marginal cost
of leverage. Therefore, the ratio between the marginal cost and the average benets of
leverage indicates the magnitude of decreasing returns.
Equation (4) can also be written as:
lnAR  ln[w0i(n)n+ wi(n) + c0(n+ 1)] =   ln  + ln "i (5)
Our estimates of  are based on this equation.
We obtain evidence on the marginal price of leverage wi0(n) from the coe¢ cients in
the wage regression implied by Assumption 6.10 Suppressing controls, this regression
equation takes the form:
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lnwi(n) = 0 + 1n+ 2n
2 + ln i (6)
The coe¢ cient estimates from this specication give us an estimate of the marginal price of
leverage, [w0i(n), for partners in o¢ ce i; we substitute these estimates for w0i(n) in equation
(5):11
[w0i(n) = [ b1 + 2 b2n]wi(n)
We estimate equation (6) using ordinary least squares. This produces downward-biased
estimates of [w0i(n), because we are not accounting for the fact that partners in o¢ ces with
a low value of i will respond by hiring more associates. Our estimates of [w0i(n) will be a
lower bound on the marginal price of leverage. This, in turn, will lead our estimates of 
which are based on the ratio between the marginal cost and average benets of leverage
to be biased downward because it leads us to understate the marginal cost of leverage.
We will therefore overstate the degree of coordination costs and hence understate the
returns to hierarchy. We will therefore characterize our results as providing lower bounds
to the returns to hierarchy, but we will also provide evidence through sensitivity analysis
that these bounds are probably close to what the actual returns to hierarchy are.12
III. DATA AND ESTIMATION
III.1. Data
The data are from the 1992 Census of Services. Along with standard questions about
revenues, employment, and other economic variables, the Census asks a large sample of
law o¢ ces questions about the number of individuals in various occupational classes that
work at the o¢ ce and payroll by occupational class. For example, it asks o¢ ces to report
the number of partners or proprietors, the number of associate lawyers, and the number of
nonlawyers that work at the o¢ ce. It also asks payroll by occupational class: for example,
the total amount associate lawyers working at the o¢ ce are paid. These questions elicit
the key variables in our analysis. Other questions ask o¢ ces to report the number of
lawyers that specialize in each of 13 elds of the law (e.g., corporate law, tax law, domestic
law) and the number of lawyers who work across multiple elds. These variables allow us
to control for the eld composition of lawyers at various points in our analysis. Our main
sample includes 9,283 law o¢ ces. This includes only observations in our sample that
are legally organized as partnerships or proprietorships, because partners and associates
are broken out separately only for these observations.13 Throughout our analysis we use
sampling weights supplied by the Census to account for the likelihood each was sampled.
These data have several aspects that lend themselves to an analysis of equilibrium as-
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signment. They cover an entire, well-dened human-capital-intensive industry in which
organizational positions have a consistent ordering across rms, and allow us to construct
estimates of individuals earnings at the organizational position*o¢ ce level at a large
number of rms. Data that allow one to connect individualsearnings with rm char-
acteristics across rms is not common, and it is even less common to be able to connect
earnings with individualsorganizational position. These data have shortcomings, how-
ever: in particular, they do not directly report partnersearnings, and thus we have to
estimate them from the data at hand. We describe how we do so in the Appendix. This
procedure, a step of which regresses law o¢ cesoverhead expenses on their characteris-
tics, also generates estimates of the marginal cost of overhead at each rm in our sample,
which we utilize when estimating equation (5).
Summary Statistics and Patterns in the Data.
Median earnings across all lawyers in our main sample are $77,000. The 25th and
75th percentiles are $44,000 and $141,000, respectively. The 95th percentile is about
$350,000; there were about 435,000 privately-practicing lawyers in the U.S. in 1992, so
this represents the earnings of roughly the 20,000th-ranked lawyer. About 40% of lawyers
are associates, 25% are unleveraged partners (partners in o¢ ces with no associates), and
35% are leveraged partners. Among the latter, less than one-half work in o¢ ces with an
associate-partner ratio greater than one.
Much of our analysis will be conducted from the perspective of partnersoptimal choice
of leverage; it is thus useful to report some statistics from the perspective of the average
partner in our sample. The rst column in Table 1 reports that average revenues per
partner were $361,000, and average partner pay was $150,000. On average, partners
had 0.6 associates, to whom they paid $36,000. The average partner worked in an
o¢ ce with 15 partners. In light of important ways in which this industry is segmented
(see Garicano and Hubbard (2012)), we classify o¢ ces in the following way. We dene
litigationo¢ ces as those with at least one lawyer specializing in a litigation-intensive
eld (negligence, insurance), and classify the remainder as business, non-litigationand
individual, non-litigationdepending on whether the o¢ ces primary source of revenues
is from businesses or individual clients. Table 1 indicates that the partners in our sample
are evenly distributed across these three classes of o¢ ces.
<<COMP: Place Table 1 about here>>
The second and third columns, which report these averages separately according to
whether o¢ ces have at least one associate, indicate that the averages in the rst column
mask a lot of variation in our sample. O¢ ces with at least one associate are much larger
in terms of the number of partners than those with no associates. Revenues per partner
and partner pay are much higher as well. Our empirical analysis will revolve around
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relationships between earnings and o¢ ceshierarchical organization; this table highlights
the importance of accounting for di¤erences in o¢ cesscale and lawyerselds (or their
o¢ ces segment), both of which are correlated with both lawyersearnings and hierarchical
structure.
In other work (Garicano and Hubbard (2012)), we have investigated earnings and orga-
nizational patterns in these data. We found that controlling for lawyers elds, the size of
the local market in which they work, and other variables, (a) partnersearnings and asso-
ciatesearnings are positively correlated, (b) partnersearnings are higher in o¢ ces where
associate-partner ratios are greater, and (c) associate earnings are greater in o¢ ces where
associate-partner ratios are greater. These patterns are consistent with the hypothesis
that manager skill, worker skill, and the worker-manager ratio should move together. We
also investigate how earnings vary with lawyersposition. We found that, throughout
most of our data and controlling for eld and local market size, associates earn less than
unleveraged lawyers, who in turn earn less than leveraged partners. Furthermore, we
found this ordering to generally remain true even when comparing associates at o¢ ces
with high associate-partner ratios to unleveraged partners. As we discuss at length in our
earlier work, these patterns are consistent with the equilibrium assignment in our model.
III.2. Estimation: wi(n) and the Marginal Cost of Leverage
We specify lnwi(n) as a polynomial in n, controls for the eld composition of lawyers in
o¢ ce i, and a full set of county xed e¤ects. We allow the polynomial to di¤er depending
on whether the o¢ ce is a litigation,business, non-litigation,or an individual, non-
litigationo¢ ce; allowing wi(n) to di¤er in this way accounts for the possibility that labor
markets for lawyers are segmented along these lines. In practice, we found little additional
explanatory power when adding terms in n beyond quadratic.14
<<COMP: Place Table 2 about here>>
The left side of Table 2 reports our estimates of this equation, using o¢ ces in our
main sample with at least one associate.15 Our coe¢ cient estimates imply that [w0i(n) is
positive for the business, non-litigationo¢ ces, and that increasing the associate-partner
ratio by one is associated with (at least) a $7,750 increase in average associate pay. In
the other segments, we do not nd any relationship between wages and the number of
associates, as none of the coe¢ cients are statistically di¤erent from zero. Drawing from
the discussion in Section II, a positive relationship between wages and the number of
associates in the "business, non-litigation sector" but not the other two sectors would be
consistent with a model in which the quality and quantity of workershuman capital are
not perfect substitutes in the business, non-litigation sector,but are perfect substitutes
in the other two sectors.
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In the right part of Table 3, we report the means and various quantiles of the marginal
cost of leverage and various components of the marginal cost of leverage. On average,
associate pay, non-lawyer pay, and benets are $116,000, and overhead costs are $18,000.
Our estimates of [w0i(n) imply that the marginal price of leverage is only $5,000 and makes
up only a small part of the marginal cost of leverage, but these estimates are lower bounds.
Combined, our analysis indicates that on average the marginal cost of leverage is (at least)
$139,000, but varies considerably across o¢ ces.
<<COMP: Place Table 3 about here>>
In the left part of Table 3, we report various quantiles of average revenues per lawyer
across o¢ ces in our sample. Comparing these to our marginal cost estimates foreshadows
our estimate of  below, which is identied by the ratio of the marginal cost and average
benet of leverage. Average revenues per lawyer are about $247,000, but the distribution
of average revenues per lawyer is highly skewed across o¢ ces. Multiplying revenues
per lawyer at each o¢ ce by one minus our estimate of the overhead share of revenues (as
discussed in the Appendix, some revenues at law rms are pass-throughexpenses) gives
an estimate of the average benets of leverage. Our lower bound estimates of marginal
costs are at least 50% of average revenues at each quantile of their respective distributions.
This foreshadows our conclusion that the returns to hierarchy will be considerable our
estimate of  will greatly exceed zero.
III.3. Estimation:  and the Coordination Cost of Hierarchy
Following equation (5), we derive an estimate of  by simply regressing the di¤erence
between the log of revenues per lawyer and the log of our estimate of the marginal cost of
leverage, described above, on the eld shares of lawyers in each o¢ ce.16 Including the eld
shares on the right side allows the coordination costs of hierarchy to vary across di¤erent
elds of the law. We also include a polynomial of the number of partners in the o¢ ce
as a regressor. This accounts for the possibility that the coordination costs associated
with leverage might be lower for larger o¢ ces, for example because larger o¢ ces might be
able to more e¤ectively utilize associatestime (or perhaps higher if coordination becomes
more unwieldy as o¢ ce size increases). This estimate is downward-biased because our
estimate of the marginal cost of leverage is downward-biased it will overstate the extent
to which coordination costs are dissipating the returns to hierarchy within the law rms
in our sample.17
The right side of Table 2 reports our estimates. The omitted eld in this specication is
general practice,lawyers who work in more than one of the Census-dened elds. The
estimate on the constant implies a value of b of 0.71 with a standard error of 0.007: this
value of  would imply for a one-partner o¢ ce consisting only of general practitioners,
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moving from n = 0 to n = 1 increases the time to which the partners knowledge is
applied by (20:71-1), or 64%. In other words, hiring your rst associate is like adding
two-thirds of an extra body to your group in terms of how it a¤ects the groups time in
production. Relative to a situation where two lawyers work on their own, hierarchical
production decreases the time these lawyers spend in production by at most 18%. This
estimate varies little with the number of partners in the o¢ ce. Although the coe¢ cients
on the number of partners are jointly statistically signicant, they are small in magnitude,
and imply that b decreases from 0.71 to 0.68 for a 50-partner o¢ ce, then increases back
to 0.70 for a 100-partner o¢ ce. In contrast we nd larger di¤erences across elds. b is
lowest about 0.50 for an o¢ ce with all negligence-plainti¤ lawyers, and highest about
0.87 for an o¢ ce with only specialists in corporate law, suggesting that the coordination
costs associated with hierarchies are high for the former and low for the latter.
IV. THE RETURNS TO HIERARCHY
IV.1 Productivity
We rst use our estimates to provide evidence on the returns to hierarchical production.
Our counterfactual is this. Suppose the match between clients and o¢ ces stayed the same,
but the division of labor were constrained, so that partners and associates do not split
work with each other optimally, but instead each works on a representative share of their
o¢ ces problems, and no collaboration is allowed. What would be the value of the lost
production?18
Consider this calculation for an o¢ ce i one partner and ni associates. This o¢ ces
revenues, which are observed in the data, are TRi = \v(zmi)(1 + ni), where \v(zmi) =
"iv(zmi) Absent the division labor, the o¢ ces revenues would equal \v(zmi) + ni\v(zwi),
where \v(zwi) = "iv(zwi): In expectation this quantity is less than v(zmi) + ni(zwi)wi,
because wi > v(zwi): from revealed preference, in expectation, associates earn more as
associates than they would if they worked on their own. A lower bound for the increase in
the value of production a¤orded by vertical specialization at o¢ ce i, averaged across the
lawyers in the o¢ ce, is therefore \v(zmi)(((1+ni) 1) niwi)=(ni+1). We calculate this
quantity for every o¢ ce in our sample, exploiting the fact that \v(zmi) = TRi=(1+ni) and
using our the coe¢ cient estimates in Table 3 to construct an estimate of  for each o¢ ce.
We also calculate this quantity under the assumption that  = 1, which corresponds to
constant returns to leverage. We therefore compare actual revenues per lawyer against
two benchmarks. One is revenues per lawyer if vertical specialization were prohibited
within o¢ ces: this provides evidence on the achieved returns from vertical specialization.
The other is revenues per lawyer if vertical specialization were allowed and there were
no coordination costs. This provides evidence on the potential returns from vertical
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specialization (but which coordination costs may limit).
<<COMP: Place Table 4 about here>>
Table 4 reports the results of this analysis. We include o¢ ces with and without
associates in the analysis, though of course the returns to hierarchy are zero for o¢ ces
without associates. Average revenues per lawyer in our sample equal $227,000. We
estimate that they would be at most $175,000 if the division of labor were arbitrary.
This estimate is robust in the sense that changing the estimate of  by plus or minus one
standard error implies changes in this amount of less than 1%. From Table 4, vertical
specialization associated with hierarchies increases productivity in the U.S. legal services
industry by at least 30%. Our estimates indicate that this ranges considerably across
o¢ ces. We calculated the distribution of the percentage increase across o¢ ces (weighted
by the number of lawyers). The 90th percentile is 58%; the median is 26%. The nal
column in Table 4 reports analogous estimates for the  = 1 case  no coordination
costs associated with hierarchical production. These estimates imply that revenues per
lawyer, holding constant the matching between lawyers and between clients and rms,
would increase to about $280,000, implying that lawyers are able to achieve at least half
of the potential gains from vertical specialization.
Our estimates thus imply that organizing production hierarchically increases produc-
tivity in legal services substantially by at least 30%. The overall returns to hierarchy
appear to be substantial in this human-capital-intensive industry.
IV.2 Earnings
Using equation (1) and using the invertibility of n(zw) to express partner earnings as
Ri(zmi; n), we next use our estimates of  to derive estimates of Ri(zmi; 0) = \v(zmi) ci(1)
at o¢ ces with associates: this is an upper bound of what partners at o¢ ce i would earn,
absent hierarchical production. This di¤ers from \v(zmi) because it accounts for the
costs of operating a zero-associate o¢ ce. We estimate \v(zmi) the same way we do in the
previous subsection. We estimate ci(1) = xi+ohi=pi, using our data on nonlawyer pay per
partner for xi and the coe¢ cients in the overhead equation (reported in the Appendix) to
estimate ohi. We compute quantiles of the distribution of Ri(zmi; 0) across the leveraged
partners in our sample and compare them to quantiles associated with our observations
of partner pay.
<<COMP: Place Figure 2 about here>>
Figure 2 reports twenty quantiles of partner pay and Ri(zmi; 0), using only partners
in o¢ ces with at least one associate; the di¤erence between the two curves reects the
e¤ect of leverage on the earnings of individuals who are, in fact, leveraged. Median
earnings among lawyers in this group are $167,000. Our estimates imply that, absent
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hierarchical production, the median instead would be at most $148,000, at least 13% lower
than the actual median. Partner pay is at least 15-20% higher than Ri(zmi; 0) between
the median and the 80th percentile, but is at least 35% and 50% higher at the 90th and
95th percentile, respectively. Considering only leveraged partners, lawyers ability to
leverage their knowledge through working with associates increases earnings inequality,
producing a substantially more skewed earnings distribution. The di¤erence between
the 95th percentile and 50th percentile of these two distributions increases from $208,000
to $364,000, and the ratio between these two percentiles is 2.4 in the counterfactual
distribution, but 3.2 in the actual distribution.
<<COMP: Place Figure 3 about here>>
Figure 3 extends the analysis to all lawyers, not just leveraged partners, as we include
unleveraged partners and associates in the construction of our earnings distributions.
This Figure depicts the distribution of lawyer pay and estimated pay absent hierarchies.
Estimated pay absent hierarchiesequals Ri(zmi; 0) for leveraged partners, as before. It
equals actual pay for unleveraged partners we observe what these individuals did earn
when unleveraged. For associates, we also assume that estimated pay absent hierarchies
equals their actual pay. This estimate is too high for the reason described above: these
individuals earn more as associates than they would absent hierarchies. Thus, since
associates tend to be below the median earnings, quantiles of estimated pay absent
hierarchiesbelow the median will tend to be too high. This will have little e¤ect on our
analysis, however, because we are most interested in upper tail of this distribution and
how it compares to that of the overall pay distribution.
The Figure provides evidence that, when looking across all lawyers, hierarchical pro-
duction tends to make earnings distributions more skewed, but this e¤ect is concentrated
on the very upper parts of the earnings distribution. The di¤erence between this and the
previous Figure reects the simple fact that well over half of lawyers are unleveraged 
they are either unleveraged partners or associates and the vast majority of these lawyers
are below the 70th percentile in both of these earnings distributions. Our estimates indi-
cate that hierarchical production leaves median earnings unchanged. But 95th percentile
earnings are 31% greater in the actual distribution than in the counterfactual distribu-
tion, and the ratio between the 95th percentile and median earnings increases is 4.8 rather
than 3.7. We conclude that hierarchical production makes an already relatively skewed
earnings distribution even more skewed. We have found that this e¤ect is even more
pronounced if the Figure extended to percentiles greater than the 95th.19
<<COMP: Place Figure 4 about here>>
Finally, Figure 4 depicts these distributions separately for lawyers in the three classes
of o¢ ces we dened earlier: business, non-litigation,individual, non-litigation, and
litigation o¢ ces. The Figure provides evidence that hierarchical production has a
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similar e¤ect on the earnings distribution among lawyers in business non-litigationand
litigationo¢ ces, increasing the ratio between the 95th percentile and median earnings
from about 3.0 to about 4.2. The estimates suggest that skill-based earnings inequality
is similar among these classes of lawyers,20 and that hierarchical production amplies
this inequality similarly. In both cases, the 95th percentile of partner pay is close to
60% higher than in our counterfactual distribution, and hierarchical production has a
broader-based impact on earnings than that in Figure 3. In contrast, lawyers in indi-
vidual, non-litigationo¢ ces look much di¤erent; our evidence suggests that hierarchical
production has a very small impact on the earnings distribution. Although lawyers in
these o¢ ces tend to earn much less than lawyers in the other classes of o¢ ces, there is
actually more earnings inequality by some measures. In part due to a long lower tail, the
ratio between the 95th percentile and the median is 5.6. This ratio is only slightly lower
in our counterfactual distribution. We conclude that the returns to hierarchy are low in
this segment of the industry, and this is reected in low levels of leverage, even among the
relatively small share of lawyers in this segment who are leveraged partners, and in the
fact that average revenues per lawyer among o¢ ces with associates in this segment tend
to be low. The latter implies a low return to hierarchy, even when the marginal cost of
leverage is low, because it implies that the partners skill cannot be high. The Figure
3 result that, overall, the impact of hierarchical production on earnings is concentrated
on lawyers on the upper tail of the earnings distribution in part reects that it has little
e¤ect on lawyers in this segment, who make up about 25% of privately-practicing lawyers
in the U.S.
IV.3 Sensitivity
Throughout the paper, we have emphasized that our estimates produce lower bounds
on the returns to hierarchy, because our estimates of the marginal price of hiring an
additional associate (and therefore the marginal cost of organizational leverage) are lower
bounds. We conducted some additional analysis that indicates that our estimates of
the returns to hierarchy are not sensitive to the marginal price of hiring an additional
associate, and therefore that our lower bound estimate of the returns to hierarchy are
close to the actual returns to hierarchy. In Table 3, we reported that our lower bound
estimate of the marginal price of leverage is very low for nearly all partners, only $5,000
on average, or about 8% of median associate pay. We explored the robustness of our
estimates by assuming that the marginal price of leverage is two, four, and ten times as
much as our estimates imply. Our estimates of the returns to hierarchy do increase but
not by much. Even assuming that the marginal price of leverage is ten times what we
estimate $50,000 rather than $5,000 on average (and about 80% of of median associate
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pay), our estimates imply that hierarchical organization increases productivity by 40%
rather than 30%.
The reason such large di¤erences in marginal price of leverage have small e¤ects on our
estimates is straightforward. Increasing the marginal price of leverage, even by a large
amount, implies a much smaller percentage change in the marginal cost of leverage and
a moderate increase in our estimates of . Even after the change, these estimates imply
signicant decreasing returns to leverage for most o¢ ces. Furthermore, recall that n is
small at most o¢ ces. A moderate increase in the estimated returns to leverage in an
industry where most entities are low-leverage to begin with implies a very small change
in the estimates of the returns to leverage that are in fact achieved. It has a similarly
small e¤ect on our estimate of how hierarchy a¤ects earnings distributions.
V. CONCLUSION
Earnings and assignments contain important information about the nature of produc-
tion and the value of organization that has been empirically ignored by organizational
economists until recently. Using this information requires embedding organizations in an
equilibrium model. We have taken a rst step towards exploiting this information by
embedding an organizational model in a labor market equilibrium with heterogeneous
individuals.
Specically, we study how much hierarchical production increases lawyersproductivity
and amplies skill-based earnings inequality. We develop an equilibrium model of a hier-
archy inspired by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and provide empirical evidence on
counterfactual productivity and earnings distributions what lawyers would produce and
earn if it were not possible for highly-skilled lawyers to leverage their talent by working
with associates. We conclude that hierarchies expand substantially the productivity of
lawyers: they increase aggregate output by at least 30%, relative to non-hierarchical pro-
duction in which there is no vertical specialization within o¢ ces. We also nd evidence
that hierarchies expand substantially earnings inequality, increasing the ratio between
the 95th percentile and median earnings among lawyers, mostly by increasing substan-
tially the earnings of the very highest percentile lawyers in business and litigation-related
segments, and leaving other lawyersearnings relatively una¤ected.
We conjecture that while hierarchies contribute substantially to productivity and earn-
ings inequality in our context, their e¤ect on productivity and especially earnings might
be much greater in other contexts. In industries where production is more physical-
capital intensive, top-level managers sometimes earn multiples in the hundreds of times of
what their subordinates earn, and they control enormous organizations (see Gabaix and
Landier, 2008). We speculate that the complexity and customization of problem-solving
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in law rms limits the ability of lawyers to leverage their human capital: coordination
costs are relatively high, as production requires some agent to spend time on each problem
and communicating the specics of an unsolved or new problem is costly. More work is
necessary in order to uncover systematic di¤erences in the return to knowledge hierarchies
across sectors and to link such di¤erences to the characteristics of the knowledge involved.
Time and knowledge are both scarce inputs, and exploiting increasing returns associated
with knowledge depends critically on how much time must be expended in doing so.
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Estimating PartnersEarnings
Partnerships commonly pay out to partners their earnings net of expenses during the
year. Thus, earnings per partner at o¢ ce i, Ri, can be depicted by the identity:
Ri = (TRi   winipi   xili   ohi)=pi
where TRi is total revenues at o¢ ce i, wi is average associate earnings at o¢ ce i, ni is
associates per partner, pi is the number of partners, xi is non-lawyer earnings per lawyer,
li = pi(1 + ni) is the number of lawyers, and ohi is overhead. This can be rewritten as:
Ri + ohi=pi = (TRi   winipi   xili)=pi
Our data on partnerships contain the variables on the right side of this expression.
Thus, we observe the sum of partnersearnings and overhead. We do not observe Ri and
ohi separately for partnerships; our task is to distinguish between these.
To do this, we utilize observations of law o¢ ces that are legally organized as profes-
sional service organizations,or PSOs. The data the Census collects for these o¢ ces
di¤ers from those the Census collects for partnerships. The Census collects data only on
the total number of lawyers at these o¢ ces and not separately the number of partners
and associates. This makes these observations unusable in our main analysis, and thus
they are not part of our main sample. However, it collects data on the total pay to
lawyers and not just to associates which makes these observations useful for analyzing
the determinants of law o¢ cesoverhead. The above identity implies:
ohi = TRi   (Ripi + winipi)  xili
The observations of PSOs contain each of the three terms on the right hand side revenues,
lawyer pay, and nonlawyer pay and thus allow us to infer overhead for each of these
o¢ ces. We estimate the relationship between overhead and rm characteristics at PSOs,
then use our estimates to obtain overhead estimates at the partnerships in our main
sample; by the identity above, this implies estimates of partnersearnings.
Estimating Overhead
Our procedure for estimating overhead relies on knowledge of the structure of law rms
costs, derived mainly from reports on law o¢ ces from the CensusOperating Expenses
Survey21 and from Altman Weils 1994 Survey of Law Firm Economics. In particular,
our procedure is mindful of the following:
21
 Non-payroll fringe benetssuch as health insurance and retirement plan contri-
butions are consistently about 15% of payroll.
 Operating expenses increase with the o¢ ces scale, some elements with the number
of people in the o¢ ce and some with the amount of business.
For example, rent increases with the number of people. Many of the expenses that
increase with the amount of business, such as o¢ ce supplies, communications, and expert
services are pass-throughexpenses which are billed through to clients but will appear as
both expenses and revenues in our data. This occurs, for example, when patent lawyers
hire engineers.
 Some operating expenses such as rent tend to be higher in larger markets.
 O¢ cescost structure might di¤er depending on whether they serve businesses or
individuals (e.g., the former might involve more travel or business development
expenses). The relationship between overhead and revenues might vary across
elds because pass-throughsare more important in some than others (e.g., patent
law).
We incorporate the rst of these by simply assuming that fringe benets are 15% of
payroll for all o¢ ces, which allows our data to be used to explain variation in ohi = TRi 
1:15  [(Ripi + winipi) + xili]. We incorporate the rest by specifying ohi as a function of
market size, revenues, and the number of individuals working at the o¢ ce (employment),
interacting market size and employment to allow for the fact that additional o¢ ce space
may be more costly in larger markets. Furthermore, we allow the relationship between
revenues and overhead to vary across elds.
We report the coe¢ cient estimates from this specication in Table A1.22 We allow the
intercept term to vary with indicator variables that correspond to the employment size
of the county in which the o¢ ce is located, and include interactions between employment
and these market size measures. The coe¢ cient estimates imply that the xed overhead
cost of a very small law o¢ ce is on the order of $28,500. The interactions suggest that the
overhead associated with each additional individual is about $2,900 in very small counties
but this tends to be much greater in very large markets. We allow the coe¢ cient on
revenues to enter quadratically and to di¤er across elds. The estimates indicate that
the relationship is concave for most elds, and strongest for patent, banking, and real
estate law. The estimates imply that overhead increases by $0.10-$0.25 with each $1.00
increase in revenues for most o¢ ces in our sample.
The R-squared for this regression, 0.70, is high. We found that more detailed specica-
tions, including those that include county xed e¤ects instead of the market size dummies
22
and that interact eld shares with the employment variables, increase the R-squared by
very small amounts and generate almost exactly the same distributions in lawyersearn-
ings as those reported later in this paper.23
<<COMP: Place Table A1 about here>>
<<COMP: Place Table A2 about here>>
We use these estimates in several ways in our main analysis. We use them to construct
estimates of partner earnings at partnerships. This involves substituting in our estimate
for ohi, and deating TRi by our estimate of overheads share of revenues at each o¢ ce,
@ohi=@(TRi) from the regression coe¢ cients in Table A1. The latter accounts for the fact
that some share of an o¢ ces revenues as reported in our data are pass-through expenses.
In Table A2, we show that the distribution of earnings that this procedure generates
closely matches the distribution of earnings of privately-practicing lawyers from the 1990
PUMS data (up until the point at which earnings in the PUMS data are top-coded).
We also use them to construct estimates of c0(n+1) at each law o¢ ce, which we insert
into equation (5). With respect to the latter, we specify:
c0i(n+ 1) = xi + oh
0
i=pi
c0(n + 1) has two terms. One is that hiring an associate requires hiring support
sta¤ as well; we assume that it requires hiring a proportionate amount of support sta¤,
which implies an increase in nonlawyer pay of xi. The other part is the increase in
overhead per partner. This increase includes an increase in fringe benets  15% of
the additional lawyer and nonlawyer payroll associated with hiring an associate. It also
includes the increase in space, computer equipment, etc. that goes along with increasing
the employment size of the o¢ ce. We use the coe¢ cients on employment in the overhead
regression to estimate this for every o¢ ce, remembering that the employment increase that
comes with hiring an additional associate includes a proportionate amount of additional
support sta¤ as well.
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Notes
1See also Garicano and Hubbard (2012) for empirical tests of Garicano (2000) that
relate law o¢ ceshierarchical structure to the degree to which lawyers eld-specialize.
2Rosen notes that the rm cannot be analyzed in isolation from other production
units in the economy. Rather, each person must be placed in his proper niche, and the
marriage of personnel to positions and to rms must be addressed directly.(Rosen (1982),
p. 322))
3It might also reect an intellectual separation between the elds of labor economics
and industrial organization that Rosen (1982) was trying to bridge.
4Notice that the fact that the measure of workers is a strictly increasing real function
dened on the skill of workers implies that there is always a strictly increasing real inverse
function.
5Although we state this assumption in general terms, it is straightforward to generate
it from rst principles in a more specic framework. In Garicano (2000) and GRH,
workers draw problems and ask for help from managers whenever they cannot solve them.
Assuming that the probability that a worker needs help is 1  zw, the number of workers
a manager can help is determined by his time constraint (1  zw)hn = 1; where h is the
per-problem time cost of helping, resulting in n0(zw) > 0:
6F (zm; zw) is closely related to production functions that have been applied elsewhere
in the literature on hierarchical sorting. The production function in Lucas (1978) can
be written as F (zm; zw; n) = zmg(n); and thus represents a special case of our model in
which the skill of workers is irrelevant, and only the skill of managers matters. A two-layer
version of the production function in GRH can be obtained from F (zm; zw) by specifying
v(z) = z, n(z) = 1=(h(1   z)), and g(n) = n for n > 1. (Other elements of GRH are
more general than our model; they allow for hierarchies with more than two layers, and
allow the skill distribution among agents to be endogenous. We make fewer assumptions
about the nature of the interaction between managerial and worker skill than GRH but
do not derive hierarchical production from rst principles as they do.)
7Note that this is distinct from the coordination cost , which reects time loss from
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working with others. Individuals optimize knowing . Furthermore, productivity is
stochastic at all o¢ ces, including o¢ ces where individuals work on their own.
8This is the standard compensating di¤erentials assumption. With homogeneous
agents, the equilibrium wage is such that individuals are indi¤erent between the di¤er-
ent amenities: the wage "equalizes" utilities (see e.g. Rosen (1987)). Note also that
individuals have the same preferences with respect to working as an associate at o¢ ce i.
This makes the equilibrium analysis simpler than in hedonic labor market models where
workers di¤er in their preferences.
9Our exploitation of the invertibility of n(z) is similar to Olley and Pakes(1995) use
of the invertibility of the investment function in productivity estimation. In both cases,
the idea is that if theory implies that an agents decision variable increases monotonically
with an unobserved variable, an arbitrary increasing function of the decision variable
substitutes for the unobserved variable. We emphasize here that the invertibility property
makes the key independent variable observable, not exogenous. As we describe later, n is
econometrically endogenous in the hedonic regressions we use because partners in o¢ ces
with higher values of i will choose to hire fewer and therefore less-skilled associates.
10We explain how we construct estimates of c0 (n(zw) + 1), the marginal overhead cost,
below and in the Appendix. We defer this discussion because it relies on our data and
institutional context, which we describe in the next section.
11In earlier versions of this paper, we used wi rather than lnwi as the dependent variable.
Our main results are nearly identical when we did so; our estimates of the returns to
vertical specialization and all quantiles of all earnings distributions are within $1000 of
those we report below.
12If associates are willing to work less for higher-skilled partners (because of better
training or contacts) this would also lead to downward-biased estimates of [w0i(n), and
would also lead us to overstate the degree of coordination costs and understate the returns
to hierarchy.
13Other o¢ ces are legally organized as "professional service organizations," or "PSOs."
As we discuss at length in Garicano and Hubbard (2012), it is unlikely that our use of
only rms organized as partnerships or proprietorships in our main analysis leads to any
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important sample selection. States began to allow law rms to organize as PSOs mainly
to allow partners the same tax-advantaged treatment of fringe benets as employees of
corporations, but this form had few other e¤ects; it remained the case that shareholders
consisted only of lawyers in the rm, and that there were no retained revenues. Selection
of rms into this form as of 1992 largely reected when the rms state allowed for
PSOs, and not di¤erences in rm characteristics; PSOs were more much common in
early-allowing states such as Florida than late-allowing states such as New York, but
their prevalence varied little with their size. In 1992, PSOs made up about one-third of
the industry in terms of lawyers, o¢ ces, and revenues.
14We have also estimated versions of this that interact the n terms with the market size
dummies reported in Table 1; these allow the slope and curvature of the wage-leverage
surface to di¤er across di¤erent market sizes. Unlike with the product market interactions,
including these market size interactions did not signicantly improve the t of the model.
One explanation for this result is that lawyersmobility leads labor markets to be more
segmented along the lines of product than geographic markets.
15We discuss the right side of this table, the production function estimates, in the
following subsection.
16"Revenues per lawyer," here and in what follows, equal gross revenues times one
minus our estimate of the overhead share of revenues, to account for the fact that gross
revenues includes "pass-through" expenses.
17There also exists downward bias because, applying Jensens inequality, E("i) = 1
implies E(ln "i) 6= 0. However, the magnitude of this bias is very small relative to the
estimates themselves, and we have found that accounting for it implies little change in the
results from our counterfactual exercises. If "i is distributed log-normally with parameters
 and 2, the assumption E("i) = 1 implies ln "i is distributed N( 2=2; 2), and thus an
OLS estimate of   ln  is biased by  2=2. Following the discussion in Goldberger (1968)
and van Garderen (2001), we have estimated this equation using maximum likelihood
under the assumption of log-normality to obtain consistent estimates of . The estimates
of  are almost identical to those we report; they are lower by about 0.02 relative to a
mean value of about 0.70.
26
18We emphasize that our calculation does not compare equilibrium outcomes with and
without hierarchies; if hierarchical production were banned, one would expect clients to
adjust to this organizational change by improving their ability to match work to individual
lawyers. The productivity e¤ects of such changes in matching are not part of our analysis
here, but would o¤set some of the loss that we calculate.
19Census disclosure regulations limit our ability to report results from very high per-
centiles, because these results would be based on a relatively small number of observations.
20There is an important caveat to this statement: we are not reporting earnings above
the 95th percentile, to avoid disclosure problems associated with Census microdata. In
any given year, the highest-earning lawyers in the U.S. tend to be specialists in litigation
who receive a share of the proceeds from a large case.
21Bureau of the Census (1996).
22We included [employment-2] rather than employment in these regressions. Our sam-
ple only contains observations of o¢ ces with positive employment, thus the smallest o¢ ce
in our sample has two individuals: a lawyer plus a non-lawyer. This normalization allows
us to interpret the intercepts in terms of the xed cost of operating a very small o¢ ce.
The error term in the OLS regression is heteroskedastic; the variance of the residual
is higher for higher-revenue o¢ ces. We therefore use a GLS estimator to correct for this.
The rst stage regresses the logged square of the residual on a fourth-order polynomial
of logged revenues. We use the predicted values of this regression as weights in the
regression we report here.
23This likely reects that (a) the cost of o¢ ce space varies little across most counties,
and (b) the relationship between operating expenses and employment which largely
reects costs associated with o¢ ce space, furniture, computer equipment, etc. indeed
should not vary depending on the details of what a law o¢ ce does.
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Table 2
The Wage-Leverage Surface, Production Function Estimates
Partnerships and Proprietorships With At Least One Associate (N=5319)
Constant 0.336
(0.010)
Associates/Partner -- "Business, Non-Litigation Offices" 0.146 Number of Partners 0.0013
(0.049) (0.0004)
(Associates/Partner)**2 -- "Business, Non-Litigation Offices" -0.021 Number of Partners**2 -9.30E-07
(0.013) (2.82E-06)
Associates/Partner -- "Litigation Offices" 0.029
(0.043)
(Associates/Partner)**2 -- "Litigation Offices" 0.007
(0.010)
Associates/Partner -- "Individual, Non-Litigation Offices" 0.002
(0.060)
(Associates/Partner)**2 -- "Individual, Non-Litigation Offices" -0.026
(0.016)
Share(Banking Law Specialist) 0.193 Share(Banking Law Specialist) -0.005
(0.062) (0.037)
Share(Corporate Law Specialist) 0.675 Share(Corporate Law Specialist) -0.201
(0.058) (0.029)
Share(Insurance Law Specialist) 0.232 Share(Insurance Law Specialist) -0.077
(0.046) (0.021)
Share(Negligence-Defense Specialist) 0.263 Share(Negligence-Defense Specialist) 0.066
(0.048) (0.021)
Share(Patent Law Specialist) 0.413 Share(Patent Law Specialist) -0.075
(0.055) (0.029)
Share(Government Law Specialist) 0.548 Share(Government Law Specialist) 0.038
(0.070) (0.044)
Share(Environmental Law Specialist) 0.517 Share(Environmental Law Specialist) 0.144
(0.104) (0.068)
Share(Real Estate Law Specialist) 0.375 Share(Real Estate Law Specialist) -0.141
(0.049) (0.035)
Share(Tax Law Specialist) 0.603 Share(Tax Law Specialist) 0.060
(0.107) (0.063)
Share(Criminal Law Specialist) -0.265 Share(Criminal Law Specialist) 0.075
(0.057) (0.046)
Share(Domestic Law Specialist) 0.082 Share(Domestic Law Specialist) 0.139
(0.072) (0.053)
Share(Negligence-Plaintiff Specialist) 0.163 Share(Negligence-Plaintiff Specialist) 0.366
(0.048) (0.026)
Share(Probate Law Specialist) 0.319 Share(Probate Law Specialist) -0.119
(0.085) (0.057)
Share(Other Specialist) 0.252 Share(Other Specialist) 0.007
(0.029) (0.017)
R-Squared 0.61 0.07
The dependent variable in the wage-leverage surface regression is  the natural log of average associate pay in the office.  Offices with at least one lawyer
specializing in insurance or negligence law are classified as "litigation" offices.  All other offices are classified as "business" or "individual" depending on whether
the majority of their revenues come from individuals.  This regression includes county fixed effects as well as the variables above.
The dependent variable in the production function is ln(revenues/lawyer*(1-K))-ln(MC), where K is the derivative of overhead with respect to revenues in the
overhead regression for the office, and MC is the estimated marginal cost of leverage for the office.  The coefficients reported here correspond to -ln(theta) in the text.
Production Function EstimatesWage-Leverage Surface Estimates
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Figure 1. Non-Hierarchical and Hierarchical Production. The top panel depicts
production absent hierarchies; sets of problems are allocated to lawyers arbitrarily and each
lawyer applies their time and knowledge toward whatever set they confront. Output is v(zm)+
nv(zw). The bottom panel depicts output under hierarchical production. The n + 1 lawyers
have (n + 1) units of time to solve problems. Lawyers divide work so that the n associates
handle the easiest parts and the partner handles the hardest parts of the problems the group
confronts. Output is v(zm)(n+ 1).
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Figure 4. The Distribution of Lawyer Pay, Estimated Pay Absent Hierar-
chies, by O¢ ce Class. This Figure reports 20 quantiles of the distribution of these quantities
for three classes of o¢ ces. Estimated pay absent hierarchiesis Ri(zm; 0) for partners at o¢ ces
with associates. It is the same as lawyer pay for partners at o¢ ces without associates, as well as
for associates. Because associates earn more as associates than they would absent hierarchies
(w(z) > Ri(z; 0)), this overstates what these individuals would earn in this counterfactual.
This upward bias primarily a¤ects our estimates of lower quantiles.
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